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Modern epidemiology and its 
discontents
O mal-estar na Epidemiologia 
moderna
ABSTRACT 
The goal of this article is to present a snapshot of an ongoing debate within 
epidemiology, pitching opposing sides in the struggle to define the path it 
should follow in the years to come. The debate among epidemiologists in 
the mid-90s pitted those who defended the idea that epidemiology should 
necessarily deal with a wide context against those who believed that science 
and public health are better served by focusing on the individual level. Ian 
Hacking’s concept of styles of reasoning was used as a theoretical tool. The 
literature was reviewed using a core set of articles as an entry point, seeking 
articles that cited them, and then back-tracking the citations of the resulting 
set in the Scopus database. The main arguments are presented according to 
levels (ontological, epistemological, axiological and pragmatic), in order to 
show an even deeper disagreement, in the very conception of science and 
its relation to social issues and public policy. 
DESCRIPTORS: Epidemiology. Public Health. Science. Knowledge. 
Review.
RESUMO
O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar o debate em curso na epidemiologia, 
evidenciando lados opostos na luta para definir o caminho nos próximos 
anos. Discussão entre epidemiólogos em meados dos anos 1990, que 
defendem que a epidemiologia deve necessariamente tratar de contexto 
amplo contra aqueles que acreditam que a ciência e a saúde pública são 
mais bem servidas focalizando o nível individual. O conceito de estilos de 
raciocínio de Ian Hacking foi usado como ferramenta teórica. A literatura 
foi revisada usando um conjunto nuclear de artigos como ponto de entrada, 
buscando os artigos que os citaram, e então seguindo as citações do conjunto 
resultante na base Scopus. Os argumentos principais, de acordo com níveis 
(ontológico, epistemológico, axiológico e pragmático), foram apresentados a 
fim de mostrar uma discordância ainda mais profunda, na própria concepção 
de ciência e da sua relação com questões sociais e políticas públicas.
DESCRITORES: Epidemiologia. Saúde Pública. Ciência. 
Conhecimento. Revisão.
Revisão DOI:10.1590/S0034-8910.2013047004777
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Epidemiologists have over time divided themselves, in 
general terms, into two camps. One side concentrates 
on the proximal aspects of the health-disease process, 
whereas the other emphasizes the broader context. 
Depending on how it is framed, this argument could be 
retraced as far as the original contributions of Engels and 
Virchow to theories of social determination of disease. 
However, our chronological framework is narrower. 
Since the formal establishment of epidemiology as 
a discipline, with courses, departments, professors, 
curricula and publications early in the 20th century, the 
proximal view became increasingly dominant, though 
not uncontested.6 From the 90s onwards, the articula-
tion of a new version of the broader contextual vision 
spearheaded a shift in the discipline which continues to 
this date. This is the period we are dealing with in this 
article. However, within the proximal view camp and 
during that time frame there has been a considerable 
amount of internal dissension by smaller groups of 
epidemiologists who believed the discipline should be 
more integrated with molecular biology, or who, to use 
Pierce’s expression, were “merely disgruntled about 
epidemiological findings”.46 This, however, is not our 
main focus.
The context versus proximal debate involves more than 
theories, encompassing worldviews that set the stage for 
the development of theories themselves, and the deploy-
ment of techniques and methods as well. Resonating 
with Kuhn’s concept of paradigm31 and Ludwik Fleck’s 
notion of ‘thought style’,14 Ian Hacking’s ‘style of 
reasoning’ seems appropriate to cast the context versus 
the proximal debate within epidemiology, as the tension 
between two contrasting styles of reasoning. Styles of 
reasoning represent particular ways of thinking, seeing 
and practicing and involve formulating propositions 
that are intelligible within a particular style. Styles 
of reasoning are “self-authenticating”18,20 since they 
establish the criteria of evaluation by which they are 
judged as well as bring into being the objects they are 
supposed to study.19,20
This study aimed to present a snapshot of an ongoing 
debate within epidemiology, pitching opposing sides 
in a struggle to define the path it should follow in the 
years to come.
HOW TO APPROACH A DEBATE 
Science thrives on debates; but not all debates take 
place at the same level. Arguments can be about specific 
findings, on whether an association between a given 
exposure and a given outcome can be considered a 
fact or an artifact.33 This kind of debate frequently 
involves discussion of methods, in the sense of whether 
adequate methods were chosen and/or deployed. More 
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rarely, the whole enterprise of inquiry is brought under 
critical examination; it is no longer a matter of discus-
sing findings and methods but the general framework 
within which the latter operate to produce the former. 
When this kind of debate grows in importance it may 
signal a confrontation of different styles of reasoning.
Approaching this sort of discussion through the 
literature is not as straightforward a proposition as it 
may seem. Keywords do not always reflect the core 
issues in the argument, and the crossfire of a polemic 
does not always retain an orderly account of citations 
between participants of a debate. Dates of publication 
do not necessarily reflect the actual order of writing. 
Different journals have different periodicity. Much of 
the argument can happen in venues other than printed 
articles, such as meetings or symposia. In our refe-
rences, there is indication that this was indeed the case 
in this debate.
We resorted to both bibliographic database searches and 
poring over citations in order to arrive at a core set of 
articles that would reflect the overall tenor of the debate. 
We chose a core set of articles24,42,43,45,63,64,66 that were 
published in the mid-to-late 90’s, which shared common 
traits of a wide critique of risk-factor epidemiology. We 
searched the Scopus database for articles that cited them 
in roughly that same period. In order to arrive at a set of 
articles that would allow at least an approximate view 
of the ongoing discussion, we independently went over 
the whole list of articles produced from the database 
query. We selected only those that actually engaged the 
main arguments, being theoretical reflections on the role 
and development of epidemiology, arriving at a smaller 
number of articles. We perused the cited references 
of that group, including those that matched the same 
criteria, arriving at a final set of 47 articles. We analyzed 
the resulting set of papers trying to elicit and synthesize 
the main positions and arguments in the debate. 
THE RUN-UP TO THE DEBATE
A full account of the history of epidemiology as a 
discipline is beyond the scope and purpose of this 
paper. Nevertheless, we would like to mention just 
one previous period in the history of the discipline, 
characterized in similar terms by a number of 
authors:28,44,67 The growth and eventual establishment 
of risk factor epidemiology from the post-war period 
onwards, culminating with the so-called “Modern 
Epidemiology” as the dominant version of the disci-
pline in the 80’s. Following changes in the preva-
lence of disease in the populations of industrialized 
countries, a certain degree of hostility to progressive 
social thinking in the context of either the cold war 
or the forced neoliberal “consensus”, and the growing 
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availability of technical means (computers), epide-
miology concentrated on the search for risk factors 
associated with chronic-degenerative diseases, devel-
oping an increasingly sophisticated set of methods that 
relied heavily on complex statistics. A new generation 
of researchers, PhDs with mathematical backgrounds, 
rose to prominence, in contrast to the preceding era, 
when MDs committed to public health predominated. 
The publication of a group of very influential books, 
like Miettinen’s, Kleinbaum’s and Rothman’s would 
mark the apogee of that epoch.44,67 Early examples of 
discontent with mainstream epidemiology, however, 
can be found in the attempts by Carol Buck to shore 
epidemiology up with popperian philosophy,5 and 
in the reaction that followed, including Susser’s 
“Thought Tormented World”.62 
However, the context had changed significantly a 
decade later. The effects of disastrous economic policies 
based on neoliberal orthodoxy (“structural adjustment 
programs”) on human lives became increasingly 
difficult to ignore, and parallel to that, paradoxically, 
the success of modern epidemiology itself seemed to 
bring it closer to its limits. The latter aspect is exem-
plified by an article published in 1995,68 authored by 
a science writer who interviewed several prominent 
epidemiologists, all associated with risk-factor epide-
miology. As a group, the interviews seemed to indicate 
that the discipline, as practiced then, was reaching its 
limits. The more significant risk factors had already 
been identified, and the ones that were being uncovered 
were weak enough to make it difficult to distinguish 
from spurious associations. Although some of the 
interviewees tried later to distance themselves from the 
most radical implications of Taubes’ article, or shift the 
blame to the press and how it reports scientific findings, 
none went as far as to totally disavow the report.70,71,77 
THE DEBATE
We can divide the epidemiologists in the latter half 
of the 90s into two groups: one arguing for a broader 
view of the objects and ideas that should be contem-
plated in epidemiologic research,24,25,42,43,45-47,60,63,64,78,79 
the other emphasizing a strict risk-factor approach, 
more concerned with putting Epidemiology on solid 
statistical grounds.48,53-57,71,72,76 We can find a core set of 
similar critiques (in the first group) and responses (in 
the second), albeit with important individual variations 
within each group. Other authors were already seeking 
to methodologically develop the approach proposed 
by the critics8-10,22,23 or elaborating its implications for 
public health2,39,40,49 but not necessarily engaging in that 
specific debate.
One of the problems in reconstructing the discussion is 
that arguments operate on different levels, that, although 
inter-related, have their specificities as well, and it is 
not uncommon to see the authors sliding between those 
levels in their discourse. In the articles we selected, we 
found arguments that could be classified, for didactic 
purposes, as (a) ontological, dealing with non-testable 
assumptions of how the world is; (b) epistemological, 
which discussed how to produce reliable knowledge 
in epidemiology; (c) axiological, concerning whether 
research should be “neutral” or valued-oriented; and (d) 
pragmatic/utilitarian, about the utility and application 
of the produced knowledge (or not) (Table).
The overall argument of the critique can be summarized 
as follows: risk factor epidemiology operates under 
an atomistic metaphysics, implying that the universe 
can be understood as a vast mechanism composed of 
elementary parts. This leads to an epistemological 
approach to the objects of inquiry that disassembles 
them into elementary components and studies their 
articulations in isolation. Its practitioners believe in 
a science that is objective and neutral, that should not 
be “contaminated” with political considerations, and 
whatever use the knowledge they produce may have, 
it is separated from the research enterprise, which is an 
end in itself. Methods are emphasized to the detriment 
of theories, and are reified as means to achieve reliable 
knowledge. The narrow focus on the individual level 
of the processes underlying health and disease leads to 
the exclusion of important determinants at the popu-
lation level, and consequently misses the opportunity 
to propose measures at that level, which would be 
inherently more efficient. The Table shows a summary 
of their critique and alternative propositions.
In addition to this generic, shared kernel, different 
authors emphasized specific aspects in their articles. 
Wing states that some of the confounders in risk factor 
epidemiology could become essential aspects of the 
context.78 Krieger emphasizes what she considers a lack 
of theory in that kind of research, and states that it would 
be important to have new guiding metaphors that could 
replace the venerable web, proposing a combination 
of a fractal structure to represent biological processes, 
Table. Synopsis of the arguments of the critics of risk factor 
epidemiology.
Argument Critique Proposition
Ontology Atomistic/
individualized 
Holistic
Classical linear 
(multi) causality
Interactions
Epistemology Reductionist/
analytic
Ecological perspective/
synthetic Reflexive
Axiology Objectivity of 
science
Socially committed 
science
Pragmatics Knowledge is an 
end in itself
Epidemiology as a key 
Public Health resource
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from the molecular to the ecological, with a scaffolding 
standing for the social processes.24 Susser & Susser make 
use of the kuhnian framework to describe the history of 
the discipline, and cast both the critique and alternative 
view as competing paradigms.63,64 They propose the 
metaphor of the Chinese boxes as a guiding principle 
for the new paradigm, acknowledging that it would 
require new techniques and methods to be fully achieved. 
Despite the idea of nested hierarchies represented as 
“boxes”, Susser & Susser emphasize the importance 
of systems and multilevel approaches (“multiple inte-
ractions between and within levels”.64 Pearce adds that 
risk factor epidemiology leads to “blaming the victim”, 
i.e., placing the responsibility of living under higher 
risks exclusively at the feet of the affected individuals. 
He makes the strongest criticism on the distancing 
of epidemiology from public health; he states that an 
epidemiologist cannot be “too political” – a decision 
not to study socioeconomic factors is a political decision 
to focus on what is politically acceptable, adding that 
epidemiology was being reduced to a set of methods 
for measurement of health and disease-related issues.45 
McMichael emphasizes the temporal dimension, stating 
that modern epidemiology has become a “prisoner of 
the proximal”, not only in terms of the overall model 
but in terms of focusing only on short-term processes.43 
Of all the critics, he most clearly makes the case that 
the problem of modern epidemiology is not doing risk 
factor research, but doing only that. Finally, he also 
makes a clear case for the application of a systems theory 
based approach: “How epidemiologists relate to that 
upstream category of question is influenced by whether 
we perceive the distal determination of disease as being 
part of either a linear causal chain or a systems-based 
causal web. (…) Causal processes within this web are 
not necessarily linear and sequential, but may involve 
interactions and feedbacks”.43
On the other side of the debate, which defended a 
narrow risk-factor approach, the authors seem to 
agree with the critics’ characterization of risk factor 
epidemiology, but disagree that this represents a 
problem: “there is no denying that epidemiologists 
have progressively concentrated on the details of 
causal mechanisms. The only surprise to us is that 
anyone would regard this preoccupation with causal 
mechanisms as a problem”.54 They defend that empiric 
“atheoretical” data gathering and interpretation, with 
emphasis on methods, is (a) scientific; (b) what can 
provide answers when other disciplines cannot. Even 
without knowing biological mechanisms that would 
explain links, risk factor epidemiology has provided 
evidence that led to actions which decreased disease 
(e.g., tobacco): “even without a clear understanding 
of mechanism, such observations provide the basis to 
modify exposures in order to prevent disease”;55 “In 
fact, the value of epidemiologic evidence for decision-
making may be the greatest when other biomedical 
disciplines have the least to offer”.55 They state that 
epidemiologists should not be “activists”. This would 
compromise the objectivity/neutrality of science: 
“we maintain that epidemiology best contributes to 
public health goals through rigor and by striving for 
the ever-elusive goal of objectivity, Mixing scientific 
and activist roles not only threatens the validity of 
epidemiologic science but reduces its benefit to public 
health”.57 They believe that science is not bound by 
a requirement of applicability; as scientists, epide-
miologists should not be burdened by this kind of 
demand. “If an astrophysicist can study the origin of 
the universe without apology, should an epidemiolo-
gist have to apologize for work that is so practical?”.54
There are also some specific variations among this group. 
Rothman is particularly keen in affirming that policy 
considerations do not belong in epidemiologic articles: 
“we want readers (...) to be able to focus on a critical 
examination of the science without confusing the issue 
with policy questions”.53 Reacting to a Lancet editorial,49 
he and his collaborators state that “accusations have 
been mounting that epidemiologists have abandoned 
their public health mission of being ‘physician-scientist’ 
to society in favor of studying the scientific arcana of 
disease causation”.54 They consider that two “accusa-
tions” were being made: “epidemiology is too indivi-
dualistic” and “epidemiologists need moral and political 
fiber”; and respond to those stating that upstream infe-
rence is less secure and intervention at that level “may 
be” less efficient than closer to disease occurrence. Poole 
& Rothman,48 commenting on a later article,65 tone down 
considerably the counter-critique, proposing an armistice 
with Susser et al stating that while they are right in their 
demand for a more comprehensive epidemiology, in their 
proposal there is room for risk factor epidemiologists to 
proceed as they always had. They reserve the harsher 
criticism for Krieger24 and Pearce45 and others; Krieger 
& Ziegler25 and Shy60 are characterized as defending 
a macro-only approach (“social production of disease 
theories”) and Vanderbrouke as defending a micro-only 
approach,74 implying that their position would be the 
reasonable middle. 
There is some disagreement on whether epidemiology 
is72 or not57 a basic science for public health, as well. 
Savitz et al deny that epidemiology is a basic science 
of public health,57 and affirm that the latter is better 
served by the former when epidemiologic research 
focuses on producing evidence of specific (i.e., at the 
individual level) associations between risk factors and 
diseases. They propose a clear division of labor between 
epidemiologists and public health workers, who would 
use the evidence to advocate for adequate public policy. 
They stress the importance of accurate measuring as 
a means to reduce uncertainty in the evidence, which 
would better serve the design of policy interventions. 
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While there are some Braudelian, longue durée, threads 
in this debate, it signals some important changes and 
its originality should not be underestimated. The 
marked differences in various approaches that place the 
emphasis on context as a common denominator is clearly 
depicted in Krieger’s book.28 It would not be possible 
for the latter to propose a fractal-based analogy before 
a body of knowledge and a rich imagery about fractals 
became available in scientific discourse; the references 
to “complex systems”23 rely on more recent work on 
complex adaptive systems; invocations of functionalist 
or behavioral thinking in the social sciences is radically 
different from a dialectic vision,45 and, more obviously, 
the critique of risk factor epidemiology once it becomes 
dominant can point to its limits in a way that was not 
possible in earlier conjunctures. It is the triumph of 
that approach that made its shortcomings more clear. 
The systematic ensemble of those criticisms, couched 
in a significantly different conception of science (itself 
based on philosophical developments available only in 
the late sixties and previously not mentioned in similar 
debates), marks a singular and relevant moment in the 
recent history of epidemiology.
A DEEPER DISAGREEMENT 
Participants sometimes talked past each other as often 
happens in scientific controversies. The critique that 
advocated a new theory, metaphor or paradigm was 
understood as an either/or proposition with regards to 
the techniques patiently developed under the aegis of 
risk-factor epidemiology. More often than not the call 
to embrace a wider worldview was misunderstood as 
an invalidation of methods and findings. 
Taking aside the obvious differences visible in the 
articles discussed, there seems to be a deeper, more 
fundamental level of disagreement between the two 
sides, in their conception of what science is and how 
it should work. Deep divergences in the ontological, 
epistemological, axiological and pragmatic dimensions 
seem to indicate an incommensurability32 of competing 
styles of reasoning.20
The critics of the status quo explicitly subscribe to a 
more contemporary philosophy of science that does not 
assume an absolute separation of facts and values, that 
relies on history instead of prescription of how science 
should be and that embraces political positions as part 
of any research that involves human populations.7,33,59 
The traditional view embraced by the risk factor epide-
miology camp, however, seems to assume a pre-20th 
century view of science as a mirror image of “reality” 
that considers objectivity as an absolute, and that for 
this reason, concentrates on methods and eschews social 
and political “contamination”.51,52 One would be hard 
pressed to find a contemporary philosopher of science 
who would underwrite any proposition of “atheoretical” 
research, for instance. 
If we consider those positions as derived from 
different styles of reasoning and take into account the 
self-vindicating aspect of such styles,20 the apparent 
impermeability of each side to each other’s arguments 
is hardly surprising. This raises an issue, pointed out 
in a critique of Hacking’s point of view:50 if styles of 
reasoning were indeed impervious to change, how to 
explain their demonstrable evolution over time? First of 
all, as Hacking18 explains elsewhere, his concern when 
he began writing about styles was not so much with the 
changes in scientific disciplines, as explored by authors 
like Kuhn and Popper, but their large areas of stability. 
Secondly, resistance to change does not mean success in 
resisting as implied in the argument. As Fleck (another 
important reference in Hacking’s work) discussed, 
resistance to new thoughts is an active process that 
nevertheless progressively recedes from finding such 
ideas unthinkable to attempts to describe them within 
the framework of the prevailing conceptions.14 The next 
step in this process would be finally having a change or 
replacement in the style of reasoning, even if complete 
substitution might only happen after a generational 
change, as Kuhn remarked with regard to paradigms.30
THE AFTERMATH
New versions of the larger debate have erupted 
occasionally since the 90’s,16,17,38,41,61,73,75 and it would 
be incorrect, even irresponsible, to claim that it has 
been settled. That is one of the risks of dealing with a 
historical reconstruction of the recent past.
The first decades of the 21st century also witnessed a 
flourishing literature that took up the critics’ proposi-
tions and developed them further, both theoretically and 
methodologically.4,10-13,26,27,69 Two articles, in particular, 
seem to characterize the growth of the critical point of 
view within the epidemiologic community. The first 
comments on (then) recent changes at the NIH, stressing 
how it was displaying an increasing commitment to 
multilevel studies of health.1 The second is a 2005 article 
that resulted from a discussion that took place in the 2002 
APHA meeting, involving 12 leaders of epidemiology 
associations, who discussed the future and challenges 
of epidemiology in this century.15 Despite its concise-
ness, it is a very comprehensive document; among the 
many statements it makes, three have direct bearing 
in our discussion: (a) that the advancement in other 
fields, especially molecular biology and genetics at one 
extreme and ecology, social science and public policy at 
the other, offer the chance to open the “black box”; (b) 
that a systems approach should be increasingly adopted, 
given the importance of both context and ecology, and 
this is tied to “the ultimate goal of all epidemiologic 
research: planning interventions to reduce the occurrence 
of disease and enhance the public’s health.”; and (c) 
that epidemiologists, as researchers and public health 
professionals, have a duty to assist the development and 
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implementation of policy based on sound information. 
This could be read as an endorsement, across the board, 
of the theses defended by the critics of the status quo.
The historical development of Epidemiology cannot be 
entirely attributed to the internal dynamics of the disci-
pline. Kuhn29 references en passant certain domains of 
knowledge that would be less likely to achieve a certain 
degree of “insulation” from the general societal environ-
ment, among them, medicine. If we extend “medicine” 
to include the health sciences, epidemiology included, 
this would be a reason why the crisis-revolution pattern 
might not directly apply. Given the constant pressures 
from society at large, the kind of transition driven mainly 
by the internal dynamics of a discipline would be less 
likely to take place, or at least, clearly perceived. Still 
according to Kuhn,30,31 the social sciences do not fit the 
single paradigm model, and possibly never will;30,31 given 
the proximity of epidemiology and the social sciences, 
this characterization could also apply to the former. 
Epidemiology has gone through some important 
changes as a discipline in recent years. The new social 
epidemiology grew considerably in importance, with an 
increasing number of publications, both in article and 
book format.28 It would be presumptuous to propose 
that the mid-90’s debate decided a controversy that 
in a sense is still being played out. There were also 
important developments in the interface of genetics 
and epidemiology in the same period,3,21,58 and even 
critics of risk factor epidemiology admit that it is still 
dominant;37 despite the growing number of articles 
and books dedicated to social epidemiology, their 
methodological approaches are still dominated by that 
model. The new methods that would be more in line 
with the critical style of reasoning are still in their 
infancy, their contribution yet to mature.36
The relevance of the critique formulated in the mid-90’s 
seems clear to us. As Lillienfeld & Lillienfeld wrote,35 
public health and epidemiology need to constantly 
nourish each other. A conception of epidemiology 
disconnected from social and political demands will not 
be able to face the challenges of a global public health, 
which include issues ranging from new health risks 
posed by recently developed technologies to claims for 
social justice.
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